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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of integration of asymmetric complements when
they are vertically di¤erentiated. While conrming the standard e¤ects
of integration, namely the internalization of the double marginalization
externality and the reduction of competition, we point out a new positive
quality e¤ect, due to an increase in the average quality of the goods on
sale. We also characterize the conditions under which integration turns
out to be optimal for both rmsand consumers. We thus provide valuable
directions for competition agencies when considering the joint ownership
in vertically di¤erentiated markets.
JEL classication : L1, L4.
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1 Introduction
In high tech industries there is an increasing evidence of asymmetric systems
consisting of a core good and complementary products.1 Typical examples of
asymmetric systems are operating systems and internet browsers, computers
and printers, televisions and video players, mobile phones and apps, inter alia.
Although in some circumstances base good and complementary products are
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1Core goods are goods that combined with another (complementary good) to create a
system can also be purchased (and used) separately. For the purpose of the paper, the terms
"core good" and "base good" are used as synonimous.
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produced within the same rm, as keeping high standard of production re-
quires specic capabilities, many small and highly specialized companies are
only concerned with the production of top-quality complementary components.
For example, while Microsoft and Apple produce both operating system and
internet browser, Linux restricts itself to the production of operating system,
and Mozilla and Google specialize in Internet browsers. Interestingly, there are
circumstances in which producers of the complementary components are fos-
tered by the producers of core goods to enter the market. This is the case of
Intel Corporation: leader in the production of microprocessor, it has a long
history of inducing entry into complementary markets through the development
and royalty-free dissemination of intellectual property. Quite often, instead,
the business philosophy of well established rms turns out to be the acquisi-
tion of complementsproducers. Recent examples is Apple acquiring Chomp
in 2012, a producer of a search engine compatible with Apples iPhone, or Mi-
crosoft acquiring Lionhead Studios in 2006, a video-games producer, and Skype
Communication in 2011.
In spite of the huge amount of empirical evidence on these practices and
the relevance of their competition policy implications, a theoretical analysis of
the incentives for asymmetric producers to prefer an arrangement compared
with another and the e¤ects on competition resulting from such a choice is still
missing.2
The aim of this theoretical paper is to identify under which conditions a core
good producer nds it optimal to acquire a complementary good seller and to
evaluate the competition policy implications of such a choice.
Among researchers, the view that an integrated monopoly may be bene-
cial to consumers is generally shared. The joint ownership of complements
benets consumers as it removes a problem of double marginalization while
possibly passing through to consumers further gains.3 This clear-cut mergers
implication is mitigated in oligopoly markets, as clearly argued by Economides
and Salop (1992). In oligopolies, "production and distribution networks are
often composed of both competing and complementary brands of components.
The complementary components then can be combined to produce products or
system, which are substitutes for one another."(Economides and Salop 1992,
105). Although the joint ownership determines vertical integration between
producers of di¤erent components, it also decreases competition as it induces
horizontal integration between producers of a given component. While the
2 In general, "there is not a consensus regarding appropriate enforcement policy with respect
to vertical mergers. This is reected in controversy over the merits of cases pursued by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States
and by the EuropeanCommission (EC) in the EuropeanUnion over the last decade." (Church
2008, p. 1455).
3For instance, when the quality of a two-product system is determined by the minimum of
the qualities of its components, an integrated monopoly in which both complementary goods
are sold by a single integrated rm dominates complementary monopolies (namely, indepen-
dent ownership) in terms of welfare implications: in fact, the rst entails higher quality goods
and higher market coverage (Economides 1999, Maruyama et al. 2011) while neutralizing the
vertical externality of double marginalization.
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former e¤ect pushes prices downwards, the latter pushes prices upward so that
the net e¤ect of joint ownership turns out to be ambiguous.
Close in spirit to Economides and Salop (1992), our purpose is to identify
how the basic ingredients of the integration problem change when a system
consists of asymmetric complements and competition develops along a quality
dimension. Although to the best of our knowledge we are the rst to combine the
notion of asymmetric system with vertical di¤erentiation, the empirical evidence
gathered so far shows that producers of complementary components may have
di¤erent skills and experience in production with immediate consequences on the
quality of components.4 Several examples can be found. In the new category of
smart phones, leader rms in designing the device and the operating platform
(e.g Apple with the iPhone) do not meet success in producing apps (Apple
with iMessage), these latter being better developed by others (e.g. Whats-App
Messenger). In the computer industry, Android, a Java-based operating system
that runs on the Linux 2.6 kernel, launched by Google in 2007, provides another
example. Google does not produce a mobile handset while investing in a software
platform for devices against Nokia and Microsoft, both leader in device.5 In
order to capture this skill-gap among rms, we put the argument in the simplest
possible vertically di¤erentiated setting. There is an incumbent monopolist
that produces a base good. This good can be equipped with a complementary
component, which is produced by the monopolist itself and by a potential rival.
The value of the base good increases with the quality of the complementary
component with which it is bundled. In line with the above considerations, we
assume that, the monopolist produces a complementary component whose quality
is lower than that produced by the potential rival.6 Of course, one can easily nd
some counter examples where the producer of the base good is also producing
the high quality component. We discuss later this alternative possibility and
provide some theoretical arguments for justifying this scenario.
When facing the rival, the monopolist can decide to sell the base good and
its low quality component as a system, thereby preventing entry. Otherwise,
the monopolist can put on sale the base good alone and the low quality system
separately. In this scenario entry is allowed so that both the low quality compo-
nent and the high quality one are on sale, while the producers are disintegrated.
Finally, the monopolist can pursue an integration strategy, thus acquiring the
rival at some acquisition price. We derive the equilibrium values in the whole
set of possibilities and identify their main properties from both a private and a
social viewpoint. Further, we study under which conditions integration can be
4Alvisi, Carbonara and Parisi (2011), assume that symmetric components are vertically
di¤erentiated and in Brito and Catalao-Lopes (2010) the asymmetric complementarity issue
is faced in case of autonomous markets.
5 Incidentally, this discrepancy among producerscapabilities is quite often evoked to justify
the increasing pattern of innovation by acquisition phenomenon taking place in the high-
tech sector: well established companies acquire innovating start-up rms as to exploit their
innovations and capabilities, thereby avoiding to pursue internal research activities.
6Gawer and Anderson (2007) discuss this matter at lenght. They state that one of the
reasons for Intel to foster small rms to enter complementary markets is indeed represented
by the skill-gap in producing complements between these rms and Intel.
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welfare enhancing, thereby drawing some competition policy implications.
We nd that from the rmsviewpoint, the incentive to integration with the
high quality system on sale always dominates the alternatives. Moreover, we
dene circumstances such that integration is optimal also from the consumers
point of view. In this regard, we conrm the horizontal and vertical e¤ects
described by Economides and Salop (1992) and describe some further forces
determined by the vertical product di¤erentiation. In particular, we identify a
positive quality e¤ect taking place whenever the market is provided with the
top quality system and a negative composition e¤ect arising whenever those
consumers willing to buy when the producers do not integrate, stop buying
under integration. So, whenever the positive e¤ects dominate the negative ones,
integration turns out to be optimal for both rms and consumers.
Our model also displays several properties that are interesting in the lit-
erature on entry in complementary markets, thereby contributing to the open
dilemma for the base good owner to enter a complementary market or leave
another rm to produce components.7 Indeed, we both provide a rationale for
the incumbent to enter the complementary market and identify circumstances
such that credibly committing to accommodate entry turns out to be the most
protable strategy.
It is worth remarking that we develop the analysis under two specic as-
sumptions, namely zero production costs and uniform consumersdistribution.
These assumptions have strong theoretical implications, as it will be discussed
at lenght in the paper. Still, we feel that they can capture some specic features
observed in high tech market, thereby making the model useful to analyse the
interaction among many relevant players in this sector (e.g. Google, Apple).
For example, the assumption of zero production costs can be easily adjusted
to consider sunk or xed costs, which represent a signicant component in the
high tech industries. Also, the uniform distribution of consumers allows to
model situations where the willingness to pay does not get more concentrated
somewhere. No doubt, there exist circumstances where tastes are related to
particular features of consumers with immediate consequences on their willing-
ness to pay in some range of the distribution. Neverthless, the massive concern
of people toward high tech products makes the traditional uniform distribution
rather satisfactory.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 the game is dened and the possible scenarios are presented. We
study the equilibrium and welfare analysis in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Then, we discuss in Section 6 the scenario where it is the producer of the base
good to develop a high-quality component. This further case can be observed
for example if the monopolist has some experience economies so to overcome
possible compatibility pitfalls between the base good and the complementary
components.8 Finally, we briey conclude.
7A huge strand of literature is concerned with this issue. We refer the interested reader to
Gawer and Henderson (2007).
8Typically, such a type of analysis is developed in the mix-and match literature originated
from Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989).
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2 The model
We consider a market with an incumbent monopolist I and a potential rival
E. The monopolist sells a base good of quality u to a population of consumers
identied by the parameter  2 [a; b], with 0 = a < b and uniformly distributed
with density equal to 1b .
For future reference, notice that, given a, the parameter b is proportional to
the willingness to pay for quality dened as a function of b. Accordingly, given
a, the higher b, the higher the heterogeneity among consumers captured by the
dispersion of the willingness to pay. Also, once xed a, namely the lower bound
of the market, moving b changes the average valuation of quality in the market
and thus the corresponding willingness to pay for quality. In particular, the
higher b; the higher this willingness to pay. So, increasing b a¤ects both the
dispersion of the willingness to pay and the average willingness to pay along the
same direction.9
Both the monopolist I and the potential rival E can sell a complementary
asset of quality vI and vE , respectively, with vE > vI . The complementary good
does not bring any value to the consumers who do not buy the base good. Still,
it allows the base good to perform better. Denoting by ui the overall quality
of the base good when equipped with the complementary variant vi, i = I; E,
uE > uI > u holds, where u is the quality of the base good alone.10 Accordingly,
the utility for consumer  when buying either of the goods is:11
U () =
8>><>>:
uE   PE when buys the high quality system
uI   PI when buys the low quality system
u  pu when buys the base good alone
0 when refrains from buying
where Pi (resp. pu) is the price paid by the consumer  for getting the base good
equipped with variant i (resp. the base good alone). Note that under separate
ownership the price paid by a consumer to use the high quality system, PE , will
be the sum of the price of the base good alone plus the price of the high quality
complementary variant.
The average cost of production of both the base good and the complemen-
tary assets are assumed to be constant and equal to zero.12 Depending on the
strategy of the monopolist when facing the rival, di¤erent arrangements can
9Consider instead the case a > 0. In this case, suppose we move both bounds of the
market: a decreases and b increases. Then the above considerations about the dispersion of
the reservation prices still hold (that is the dispersion increases). In constrast, the e¤ect of
these changes of a and b on the average valuation of quality is ambiguous: namely when the
decrease in a is relatively larger than the increases in b, this valuation decreases.
10We discuss the opposite case in which the incumbent can o¤er a high quality system (i.e.
uI > uE > u ) in Section 6.
11Note that the assumption a = 0 implies that at equilibrium the market is always uncov-
ered.
12While the zero cost assumption allows us to keep the analysis neat and to focus on the
private and social incentives to allow entry and/or integrate, it can a¤ect the equilibrium
analysis. We discuss about this in Section 6.
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be observed in the market. There can be a case, where the monopolist sells
a system consisting of the base good and the low quality component. In this
scenario, entry is prevented and the high quality variant is never marketed at
equilibrium. Otherwise, the monopolist can o¤er both the base good alone and
the low quality system separately. Then, there is room for the rival to sell the
high quality complementary variant and separate ownership emerges at equilib-
rium. Finally, the optimal strategy for players can consist of joint ownership or
integration. In this case, at some acquisition price the monopolist acquires the
rival and thus sells on its behalf the complementary high quality variant vE .
In the following section, we dene the game and analyse the above described
scenarios in turn.
3 The game
The equilibrium path is dened in a two-stage game which develops as follows.
First the incumbent decides whether to allow entry. Then, in case of entry, the
incumbent and the rival compete in prices or possibly integrate (if this is the
most protable strategy). We solve the game by backward induction and nd
the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Monopoly Let us consider the rst scenario, where the incumbent sells only
the system of quality uI > u, consisting of the base good and the low quality
component. It follows that entry is not allowed and competition is kept out
from the market. Then, each consumer  can either buy the low quality system
and get utility uI   PI or not buying at all and get a nil utility. As now the
monopolist extends the monopoly power to the complementary market, from
standard computations one immediately obtains the equilibrium price PmI , prot
mI and consumer surplus CS
m:13
PmI =
1
2
buI ;
m
I =
1
4
uIb
2; CSm =
1
8
uIb
2:
Separate ownership Otherwise, the monopolist can sell the base good and
the low quality system, separately. In this case, the rival can enter the market
and sell the high quality component. Thus, it follows that, each consumer can
either buy only the base good at price pu and get utility u   pu; or buy the
base good equipped with the low quality (resp. high quality) complementary
variant at some price PI (resp. PE = pu + rE , where rE is the price of vE
sold by the high quality complementary producer) in which case the utility is
uI   PI (resp. uE   pu   rE); or refrain from buying. As we prove in the
Appendix, at equilibrium, depending on the consumersdispersion of quality
valuation (b) and the quality gap between the systems (uG = uE=uI), there can
be a conguration with positive demands for the low quality system as well as
for the high quality system; a further conguration can be such that all active
13Given the demand b  PI
uI
, it is straightforward to nd these equilibrium values.
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consumers buy either the low quality system or the high quality system; nally,
one can observe a conguration with a positive demand for the base good alone
and the high quality system as well.14 To specify the equilibrium congurations,
we proceed as follows.
We start dening the consumer indi¤erent between buying something and
not buying at all, say . We can prove that  = PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
for b  b (uG) ; where b (uG) = 2uG+1(uG+2) . Under this market conguration, we
show that PIuI =
pu+rE
uE
and PIuI <
pu+rE
uE
whenever b = b (uG), and b < b (uG),
respectively. Notice that @b@uG > 0. That is to say that the higher uE (resp. the
lower uI); the wider the range of parameters such that the condition b < b is
satised. Then, let us denote by  the consumer indi¤erent between buying the
low quality system and the high quality system, namely  = pu+rE PIuE uI . We nd
that  = b and  < b whenever b = b (uG) and b > b (uG), respectively, where
b (uG) =
2uG+1
4uG 1 . From the above, it emerges that the demand for the high qual-
ity bundle turns out to be nil in the case when the quality di¤erential between
bundles does not su¢ ce to compensate their price gap so that not even con-
sumers with high reservation prices are willing to buy the high quality system.
Traditionally, in vertically di¤erentiated markets, depending on the dispersion
of the willingness to pay for quality, an upper bound to the number of surviv-
ing variants at equilibrium can be identied (niteness property). Furthermore,
the surviving variants are those at the top of the quality ladder, those lying at
the bottom being pushed out from the market (Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Gab-
szewicz and Thisse, 1979). In our model, at rst sight this property no longer
holds. Even worst, it seems that the ratio underlying the niteness property is
reversed, as we nd that, for certain ranges of parameters, at equilibrium only
the lowest quality variant is sold. Notice however that, the above nding has
nothing to do with the notion of natural oligopoly where the niteness prop-
erty arises.15 Rather, it follows from the fact that the price of the high quality
bundle is a¤ected by both the price rE dened by the high quality producer,
and the price pu dened by the competing rm I. So, if pu is set very high
by the incumbent and the reservation price b for the high quality system is not
su¢ ciently high, given the price of the low quality bundle, it may well happen
that the high quality bundle does not face demand. In other words, our result
derives from the asymmetric nature of the base good versus the complementary
variant: as this latter cannot be consumed without the former, the producer
of the base good can prevent consumers from buying the high quality bundle
by quoting an extremely high price for the base good alone. It is worth noting
that, @b@uG < 0. This implies that, ceteris paribus a lower uE (resp. a higher uI)
increases the set of parameters such that consumers are not willing to buy the
14We exclude the possibility that all active consumers buy the base good alone as it is not
incentive compatible with the entrant possibility to produce the high quality complementary
component.
15As the market is always uncovered at equilibrium, we do not have a natural
monopoly/duopoly.
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high quality system compared to the low quality alternative as the quality gap
between bundles decreases.
Accordingly, we can conclude that.
Lemma 1 Under separate ownership, at equilibrium, for any b < b, the demand
for the high quality system is nil, and all active consumers buy the low quality
system; for any b  b  b both the high quality system and the low quality system
have a positive demand.
Proof. See the Appendix, Section 9.1.
As a consequence of the above statement, whenever b < b the market is
kept monopolized by the incumbent and provided with the low quality system,
as in the monopoly scenario. Accordingly, the demand function for the low
quality system writes as

b  PIuI

and equilibrium price P so;II , prot 
so;I
I and
consumer surplus CSso;I turn out to be:
P so;II =
1
2
buI , 
so;I
I =
1
4
uIb
2, CSso;I =
1
8
uIb
2;
where superscript so; I denotes this separate ownership scenario. In this case,
at equilibrium the incumbents prots under separate ownership so;II coincide
with those observed under monopoly, mI . In the case when b  b  b , both
demands turn out to be positive at equilibrium. In particular, consumer types
 2 (   PIuI ) buy the low quality system, whereas consumer types  2 (b  
) buy the base good as well as the high quality component. In this market
conguration, that we label so, equilibrium prices psou , P
so
I and r
so
E , prots 
so
I
and soE and consumer surplus CS
so turn out to be
psou =
1
6
uI +
1
3
uE , P soI =
1
2
buI , rsoE =
1
3
b (uE   uI) ,
soI =
1
36
b2 (5uI + 4uE) , soE =
1
9
(uE   uI) b2,
CSso =
4u2E(2b 1)2+uIuE(b 2)2+u2I(2b 8b2+1)
72(uE uI) .
It is worth noting that even for b  b  b , it is reasonable that no consumer buys
the base good alone. In order to serve the low consumer types, the monopolist
would be required to quote a very low price for the base good. As no price
discrimination is allowed, the incumbent should quote a unique low price for
both the low and the high consumer types. Thus, when selling the base good
to those consumers willing to buy the high quality complementary variant, it
would be prevented from taking advantage of the high quality component. We
show in the Appendix that this latter price strategy is never protable, thereby
proving that the condition that PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
is an equilibrium
strategy.
On the contrary, in the case when b > b, the condition PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
is not always satised. In particular, for b > b, it emerges that the active con-
sumers choose to buy the high quality system rather than the low quality system.
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Nevertheless, depending on the quality gap between uE and u, the nature of
price competition changes. In particular:
 whenever the quality gap between the high quality system and the base
good is not very signicant, namely uE < 2u, the monopolist cannot
exclude that some potential consumers are willing to buy the base good
alone. In this case, the demand for the monopolist and that for the high
quality producer write as (b   puu ) and

b  rEuE u

, respectively. It is
immediate to show that, these demands, at the equilibrium prices r0E =
1
2b (uE   u) and p0u = 12bu, are both positive and the equilibrium prots
are:
I =
1
4
b2u, E =
1
4
b2 (uE   u) .
It follows that, the assumption that no consumer is willing to buy the base
good alone, namely PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
no longer holds.
 Whenever the complementary variant brings a substantial improvement
to the performance of the base good, namely uE > 2u, the monopolist
targets only those consumers willing to use the high quality system. As a
consequence of this monopolists choice, the demand for the base good and
that for the high quality system coincide and write as (b  pu+rEuE ). Price
competition leads to the following equilibrium price, prots and consumer
surplus:
pso;Eu =
1
3
buE , r
so;E
E =
1
3
buE ,

so;E
i =
1
9
b2uE ; i = I; E,
CSso;E =
1
18
uEb
2.
We can conclude the following.
Lemma 2 Under separate ownership, at equilibrium, for b > b: (i) whenever
uE < 2u, there are consumers willing to buy both the base good alone and the
high quality system; rather (ii) whenever uE > 2u, all active consumers buy the
high quality system.
Proof. See the Appendix, Section 9.1.
Integration strategy Let us now move to consider the case when the incum-
bent acquires at some acquisition price PA the high quality producer. In this
scenario, that we denote int, the monopolist can avoid to compete against the
rival and sell the high quality system on its behalf while paying an acquisition
price for the integration. A priori, under integration the monopolist can sell all
three variants, combinations of two of them, or only one of them, namely the
top combination uE at price PE .16 We nd the following.
16Selling only the low combination uI coincides with the monopoly scenario.
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Lemma 3 Under integration, at equilibrium only the high quality system is on
sale.
Proof. Suppose that the incumbent sells all the three variants. Then, the prot
maximization problem writes as
max
pu;PI ;PE

(e   )pu + (   e)PI + (b  )PE
where PE is the price of the high quality system; the indi¤erent consumer types
are  = puu ,
e = PI puuI u and  = PE PIuE uI . Equilibrium prices, pintu , P intE and P intI ,
prot intI and consumer surplus CS
int are then:
P intE =
1
2
buE ; P
int
I =
1
2
buI ; p
int
u =
1
2
bu;
intI =
1
4
uEb
2;
CSint =
1
8
uEb
2:
The demands for the base good alone and the low quality system corresponding
to the equilibrium prices P intI and p
int
u are equal to zero. Thus, only the high
quality system turns out to be sold at equilibrium.
Selling more than one quality would entail a positive market expansion e¤ect,
as some consumers refraining from buying the high quality system would be
willing to buy an alternative good, either the base good or the low quality
system. Nevertheless, this positive e¤ect is overcompensated by a negative
cannibalization e¤ect. Indeed, when expanding the range of variants on sale,
the monopolist would lose those consumers moving from the high quality system
to the competing good, whatever it is. As the equilibrium price of the alternative
good would be lower than that of the high quality system, the monopolist would
su¤er a prot loss from this.17
4 Equilibrium analysis
It remains now to set the equilibrium analysis, namely to see whether the incen-
tive to acquisition dominates the alternative choices. To this aim, notice that, in
order to be preferred over the alternatives, the acquisition proposal should yield
the high quality producer E a gain PA at least equal to the prots it would get
under turning o¤ the proposal. Furthermore, it is convenient for the incumbent
I to make such a proposal if, and only if, prots obtained when acquiring the
high quality producer after paying the acquisition price PA are larger than the
prots it would get in the alternative scenario, whatever it is. We know from
the previous section that:
17This is a well established result in the literature studying monopoly and product quality,
see inter alia Acharyya (1998).
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 For b < b, the demand for the high quality system is nil. Thus, no room is
left to the high quality producer and the acquisition price turns out to be
zero.18 Of course, in this scenario, integration dominates the alternative
monopoly choice as intI =
1
4uEb
2 > mI =
1
4uIb
2.
 For b  b  b , both the players get positive prots at equilibrium. In-
deed, the incentive for the incumbent to allow entry, namely soI , always
dominates that to prevent the rival from selling the high quality compo-
nent, namely mI , as 
so
I   mI = 19b2 (uE   uI) > 0. Accordingly, the
acquisition price PA turns out to be equal to the equilibrium prots that
the high quality producer would get under separate ownership, namely
soE =
1
9 (uE   uI) b2. As intI   PA(= soE ) > soI , then integration is
preferred over the alternative.
 Finally, for b > b, we nd that whenever uE < 2u, the incumbent prefers
the monopoly scenario as I(= 14b
2u) < mI (=
1
4uIb
2); whereas for uE >
2u, the incumbent allows entry if and only if uE > 94uI . Indeed, when
the high quality system is by far higher than the low quality system,
equilibrium prots under separate ownership so;EI are higher than those
under monopoly mI . Accordingly, for uE <
9
4uI ; the acquisition price is
zero, as in this range of parameters entry would be blockaded; whereas for
uE >
9
4uI the acquisition price results to be PA = 
so;E
E (=
1
9b
2uE), as now
the high quality producer would be allowed to enter the market. Therefore,
whatever the quality gap between variants, for b > b, integration is the
optimal strategy.
Thus, the above comparisons prove the following result.
Proposition 4 At equilibrium, integration always prevails over the other sce-
narios.
Let us spend now a few words on the role of the uniform distribution of
consumers in the analysis. Although the vertical di¤erentiation model has been
developed often under the assumption of uniform continuous distribution, recent
works have shown how di¤erent consumersdistributions can alter the equilib-
rium analysis.19
In particular, two basic mechanisms can be activated when the willingness to
pay gets more concentrated somewhere compared with a uniform distribution:
rst, some of the consumers with the lowest willingness to pay, who were not
willing to buy at all (resp. willing to buy) under uniform distribution, purchase
(resp. stop purchasing); further, some consumers whose willingness to pay is
18This can be seen as an irrelevance result : the market equilibrium is independent of the
incumbent decision to allow or not entry. Formally, dis;II = 
m
I .
19For example, Acharyya (1998) considers the e¤ect of a discrete consumersdistributions
on the quality menu choice by a monopolist. More recently, Bonisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed
(2007) show that there exist particular non uniform consumers distribution such that the
equilibrium does not exist.
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now higher (resp. lower) are willing to move from a low-quality to a high-quality
variant (resp. from a high-quality to a low-quality variant).20 Accordingly, the
incentives for consumers to buy, and if so, to choose a particular variant, change
with the distribution and so well the incentives for rms to select the product
lines. In our model, assuming a uniform distribution allows to clearly disen-
tangle the two e¤ects taking place when competition develops along a quality
dimension (the quality e¤ect and the composition e¤ect) besides the basic in-
gredients of the dilemma between joint ownership versus separate ownership.
Nevertheless, it prevents us from considering a consumersdriven incentive to
production, namely to analyse how rms could react to some distributional
shock in terms of production menu. Let us assume for example a distributional
shock such that consumers get more concentrated toward a. This could increase
the protability of producing the low quality variant compared with the high
quality complementary product, with immediate consequences on the protabil-
ity of the integration choice. Symmetrically, the same rationale can be applied
to the scenario with consumers more concentrated toward b. In this case, some
consumers willing to buy the low quality variant under uniform distribution
could be willing to buy the high quality system now. Also, some others not
buying before could now enter the market. Thus, the equilibrium conguration
would change depending on the relative weight of these incentives.
5 Welfare analysis
We have shown above that the privately optimal strategy is integration between
rms. We next wonder whether a competition authority would allow such an
acquisition. As a measure of welfare we consider consumer surplus (CS). We
discuss in Section 7 what changes when moving to the social welfare as alterna-
tive measure of welfare.21
Let us remind here that, if integration would be banned, then at equilibrium
one could observe either monopoly or separate ownership, depending on the
dispersion of consumerswillingness to pay for quality, and on the qualities of
the systems. In particular, the outside option is separate ownership whenever
b  b  b , or b < b and uE > 94uI ; and monopoly otherwise, namely for b > b ,
or b < b and uE < 94uI .
In this latter case, consumer surplus under integration (CSint = 18uEb
2)
is higher than that under monopoly (CSm = 18uIb
2). This result is rather
intuitive as in both cases the market is monopolized, however under integration
the product quality is higher than under monopoly (uE > uI).
In the case when the outside option is separate ownership, comparing the
equilibrium consumer surplus under separate ownership versus integration, we
nd that for b and uE su¢ ciently high, consumers are better o¤ under integra-
20Benassi et al. (2006) clearly disentagle these mechanisms in the case of purely distributive
shocks to the distribution of the consumerscharacteristics, namely shocks that do not modify
the mean and the support of the distribution itself.
21Formal details are in the Appendix, Section 9.2.
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tion than under separate ownership. Indeed, in both cases, at equilibrium all
active consumers would buy the high quality system; however under integration
the double marginalization problem is removed, as the incumbent sells both the
base good and the high quality complementary component.22 As for b  b  b ,
the sign of the di¤erence between consumer surplus under separate ownership
CSso and under integration CSint depends on the average valuation of qual-
ity in the market b and the quality di¤erential uG = uE=uI . In particular,
CSso   CSint > 0 whenever b < eb, where eb(uG) = 1+2uG7uG 4 < b. Furthermore,eb > b () uG < 52 , while the reverse is true, namely eb < b, otherwise. The
following Proposition summarizes our previous considerations.
Proposition 5 From the consumersviewpoint: integration is always improv-
ing for high values of the quality gap; in contrast, whenever the quality gap is
not so signicant, integration is improving if and only if the average valuation
of quality in the market is su¢ ciently high.
The idea underlying the above ndings goes as follows. When the quality gap
is extremely high, then the integration scenario is socially optimal for any value
of b. Indeed, for low values of b, under both integration and separate ownership
the market would be monopolized. However, under integration the product
quality is higher than under monopoly (uE > uI). This is a positive quality
e¤ect of integration. For high values of b, instead, under separate ownership,
namely in the so;E scenario, only the high quality system is put on sale. This
is the same result as under integration. So, moving from separate ownership to
integration does not a¤ect the average quality of the goods on sale. However
under integration, the rm is able to internalize the double marginalization
externality. This is a positive pricing e¤ect of integration.
On the contrary, in the case of a low quality gap (uG < 52 ), moving from
separate ownership to integration entails on one hand the two positive e¤ects
detected above (the positive quality and pricing e¤ects); on the other hand,
two negative e¤ects linked to the reduction of competition become relevant.
Indeed, under int, only the high quality system is marketed, while under separate
ownership both qualities are on sale. As a result of this reduction in the number
of qualities, some of the consumers that under dis were buying the low quality
system move to the high quality system under int ; however some others stop
buying. This latter negative composition e¤ect of demand is weaker, the higher
is b. Finally, when switching from dis to int, competition becomes milder as we
now have only one rm rather than two; this negative competition e¤ect is not
very strong when consumers are very heterogeneous (it is as if each rm had its
own segment of the market). Accordingly, the two negative e¤ects of moving
from dis to int dominate as long as b and the quality gap are su¢ ciently small,
thus driving the consumerspreference for so over int.
22This is the Cournot (1938) result according to which when an intergrated monopoly sells
two complementary goods prices are lower than when two separate monopolists sell each one
of these complementary goods.
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6 Reversed qualities in the complementary mar-
ket
In the equilibrium analysis we have shown that integration always takes place
and, as a result, only the high quality system is on sale. These conclusions are
drawn under the crucial assumption that the quality of the incumbents com-
plement is lower than that of the (potential) rival. One may wonder whether
our ndings still hold in the case when the reverse takes place, namely it is the
monopolist to produce the top quality. At least two arguments could justify
this assumption. First, the monopolist could have some experience economies,
thereby being able to produce a better complement than the rival. Further, he
could be allowed to combine in a better way the base good and the complemen-
tary variant so as to escape from possible compatibility pitfalls. The purpose
of this section is to discuss this further scenario, thereby considering that the
quality of the rivals complement is lower than the quality of the incumbents
complement.
Zero quality costs Let us start rst keeping the assumption of zero quality
costs. Borrowing from the existing literature that with a uniform distribution
of consumers, "if no cost is attached to quality improvement, the monopolist
will always select the top quality" (Gabszewicz and Wauthy, 2002, 2), we can
guess that in our model the incumbent would nd it protable to o¤er only
the high quality system and entry would be blockaded. Indeed, having at its
disposal also the high quality complementary good, the monopolist would not
have incentive to let the low quality complements producer enter the market, as
this latter would cannibalize the incumbentprots in the case of entry. Rather
interestingly, this argument is not only detailed by the existing theoretical liter-
ature (see also Bonisseau and Lahamandi-Ayed, 2006) but also validated by the
empirical evidence. To give an example, Gawer and Henderson (2007) explore
Intels strategy with respect to complements. They nd that "Intels behavior
with respect to complementary markets is greatly shaped by whether the rm
can match the competencies of potential entrants" (p. 3). Namely, the incen-
tive for the base good producer to accommodate or rather blockade entry in
the complementary market is mainly related to the skills of the complementary
variants producer: as long as this latter is very skilled (competent), the former
can benet from allowing entry!
Positive quality costs Notice however that, costs for quality improvements
are not always negligible. So, it can be interesting to extend the above discus-
sion to the scenario with quality-specic production costs. Once more, we can
refer to the existing literature on vertical product di¤erentiation to discuss this
further possibility. The pioneering contribution by Mussa and Rosen (1978)
shows that, under monopoly, quality discrimination takes place and quality is
underprovided with respect to the competitive outcome, when quality-specic
production costs are taken into account. So, a priori one could be induced to
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state that the pooling menu (namely the top quality good to all consumers) we
found at equilibrium in our model is no longer observed under the assumption
of positive quality costs. Acharyya (1998), however, relaxes the Mussa-Rosen
statement and shows that it depends, inter alia, on the specication of the cost
function. If the cost function is not su¢ ciently convex in quality, the monopolist
o¤ers a pooling menu.23 This case can be observed for example when marginal
costs of quality are constant. In light of this analysis, we can extend our ndings
to the case where quality costs do not increase too fast, thereby concluding that,
under this condition, o¤ering the top quality bundle is still the most protable
choice. Indeed, if a separating menu (namely di¤erent qualities to di¤erent con-
sumers) is not observed at equilibrium, the e¤ects inducing the incumbent to
allow or prevent the rival from o¤ering the complementary variant are still at
work, so that our qualitative ndings do not change.24
Admittedly, it is not clear whether the equilibrium we nd is robust to the
alternative case when the cost function is highly convex in quality. We know
from Acharyya (1998) that in this alternative scenario, there are circumstances
such that the incentive to a separating menu may dominate that to a pooling
menu. Thus, in our model one should contemplate the possibility that it is prof-
itable for the incumbent to o¤er both the base good and the high quality bundle
at equilibrium. Still, such a type of strategy would allow the rival to enter the
market and to o¤er the low quality complementary variant. In particular, with
the two producers being active in the market, two main e¤ects would be ob-
served. On the one hand, the incumbent would be penalized by a competition
e¤ect as the market would move from a monopoly to a duopoly. On the other
hand, there could be a positive e¤ect.25 More precisely, when the average con-
sumerswillingness to pay for quality, b, is su¢ ciently high with respect to the
quality costs, with the low quality system on sale, the incumbent could at least
partially appropriate of the benet deriving from those low-type consumers that
now buy this low quality system rather than the base good alone. Of course,
this positive e¤ect can only take place when the price of the base good is set
su¢ ciently high that no consumer buys the base good alone.26 More precisely,
as no price discrimination is allowed, in order to serve both consumers buying
the base good alone and those buying the low quality bundle, the incumbent
should quote a very low base good price. Still, at this price, it could not take
advantage of the increased willingness to pay measured by (uE   u) > 0. So,
when the consumersaverage willingness to pay is relatively high, serving at a
23More precisely, he shows that the extent of market coverage under a pooling menu depends
on the distribution of consumers across di¤erent types.
24Rather interestingly, a pooling menu can also be observed when there are economies of
scope in production. Kim and Kim (1996) consider a vertically di¤erentiated market where a
monopolist facing a discrete distribution of consumers can reduce total costs of production by
jointly producing two products. In this circumstance, they prove that there exist conditions
on cost relatedness such that the monopolist nds it protable a separating menu. Still, a
pooling menu can arise at equilibrium under other conditions.
25See Appendix 9.3.2 for details.
26As shown in Appendix 9.3.2 at the separate ownership equilibrium the demand for the
base good alone is zero for b su¢ ciently high.
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high price only consumers willing to buy the low quality system is by far more
protable than serving even those willing to buy the base good alone at lower
price. On the contrary, when b is relatively low with respect to the quality costs
so that the prots from the high quality system are ceteris paribus less signi-
cant (or nil for very low values of b),27 having the low quality complementary
variant on sale allows the incumbent to sell the base good to a larger share of
the market with a positive e¤ect on prots.
It follows that the market structure under separate ownership depends on
the balance between the above e¤ects. When the negative competition e¤ect
overcompensates the positive e¤ect, entry is blockaded. Otherwise, namely when
the positive e¤ect prevails over the negative, there is room in the market for the
low quality producer.28
Consider now the integration scenario. The acquisition price depends on the
low quality rms outside option. If the monopolist has incentive to blockade
entry, the acquisition price is nil and we can reasonably conclude that acquisition
takes place. In this case, as far as the quality menu choice is concerned, in line
with the existing literature, we can show that the monopolist has incentive to
quality discriminate. In particular, when b is su¢ ciently high, the monopolist
o¤ers both the base good alone and the two systems. On the contrary, for low
values of b, the high quality system is not put on sale.29 If instead the monopolist
has incentive to allow entry, the acquisition price turns out to be positive. In
this case, if acquisition is protable compared to the outside option, we are
again in the integration scenario when the monopolist can quality discriminate.
Notice that, such a type of setting would entail di¤erent welfare implications
compared to the original setting with zero costs and the monopolist producing
the low quality variant. Indeed, with positive and su¢ ciently convex production
costs, under integration one can observe the whole set of variants on sale at
equilibrium. This selling choice departs from that observed when production
costs are nil: under integration only the high quality system is on sale when
costs do not play any role. So, moving from the assumption of zero costs to
that of highly convex quality costs with the incumbent being the producer of
the high quality system, determines, under integration, a wider set of variants
on sale, with a lower average quality level. Rather interestingly, with such a
type of quality-specic production costs, integration expands the set of variants
in the market also with respect to both the alternative scenarios of separate
ownership and blockaded entry. Accordingly, while the rationale behind the
vertical and horizontal e¤ects observed in Economides and Salop (1992) still
holds, that underlying both the quality e¤ect and the composition e¤ect, evoked
in the introduction, can change in this new framework, their extent and direction
being not clear-cut a priori. Finally, not even an unambiguous conclusion on
the welfare properties of integration can be reached when evaluating the price
e¤ect. Indeed, the optimal equilibrium prices are now depending not only on
27As shown in Appendix 9.3.2 at the separate ownership equilibrium the demand for the
high quality system is zero for b su¢ ciently low.
28 In Appendix 9.3.1 we show that there are cases in which blocking entry is unprotable.
29See Appendix 9.3.3 for further details.
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the competition between rms or cannibalization phenomenon in the case of
integration, but also on the quality-related costs incurred by each rm when
producing its own quality.
7 Some policy implications
The result stated in Proposition 5 represents something to chew on by com-
petition agencies when evaluating proposed mergers. Indeed, it shows that in
vertically di¤erentiated markets, the traditional welfare enhancing e¤ect (tak-
ing place when the double marginalization is removed) can be magnied by a
positive quality e¤ect. Further, as the negative competition e¤ect, if any, can
play a minor role when consumers are very heterogeneous, it may well happen
that, even when enhancing a monopoly structure, integration can benet con-
sumers. We have considered consumer surplus as a measure of welfare, showing
that rmsand consumers interests can be diverging in some circumstances.
It follows that, if a competition authority would refer to consumer surplus in
order to decide whether preventing rms from integration, this latter would be
banned in several cases, namely whenever integration would harm consumers.
This is no longer true when identifying the e¤ects of integration based on the
social welfare (consumer surplus plus producer surplus). Indeed, integration is
found to be always social welfare improving.30 This is due to the fact that the
rmsprots under integration are so high to neutralize the possible damage to
consumers. Accordingly, there are circumstances such that integration could be
banned or rather allowed depending on which welfare measure would be taken
into account!
One could question our arguments while saying that the above considera-
tions hold under the assumption that the monopolist can only o¤er a low quality
system when preventing the rival to enter the market. Still, we have discussed
at length the case when the reverse holds, namely the monopolist in the base
market can also produce a high quality variant in the complementary market. It
is interesting to notice that, even under the alternative scenario, there exist cir-
cumstances such that integration is welfare improving at least from consumers
viewpoint. No doubt, in order to draw further insights into the consumersver-
sus social welfare properties of this case, an in-depth formal analysis would be
necessary. Still, our preliminary results can be intended as a natural entry point
for further research as they show that, from a competition policy perspective,
integration can be allowed on a welfare ground whatever the specic skills of
rms to the extent they are involved in complementary productions.
8 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the e¤ects of joint ownership of asymmetric comple-
ments when they are vertically di¤erentiated. Although our model is highly
30Formal details are in Appendix, Section 9.2.
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stylized and introduces some specic assumptions on the cost functions and the
distribution of consumers, it provides strong arguments for the positive nature
of network integration among rms in vertically di¤erentiated markets, while
showing at the same time that, under some circumstances, anti-competitive con-
sequences can be observed. Although our arguments depend on the assumptions
of the model, they can represent a starting valuable point for competition agen-
cies when considering the joint ownership in vertically di¤erentiated markets.
Two possible extensions are worth discussing. First of all, our ndings were
proved to hold under the assumption that price discrimination is not allowed.
There are at least three main justications for this assumption. First, compe-
tition authorities could show hostile attitude to price discrimination practices
because a dominant rm may exploitnal consumers by means of price dis-
crimination, with negative e¤ects on consumerswelfare. Second, and especially
in Europe, it is sometimes a policy objective to attain a single marketacross
the region. Arguably, one manifestation of a single market is that a rm does
not set di¤erent prices in di¤erent regions. Third, price discrimination can be
used by a dominant rm to exclude(or weaken) actual or potential rivals from
the market, thereby preventing them from entering or forcing to exit. Of course,
there exist circumstances such that price discrimination allows to extend market
coverage with possibly a positive e¤ect on welfare, ceteris paribus. In this case,
the authorities should put in balance this latter welfare-enhancing e¤ect with
the above evoked forces leading to a less competitive market structure. When
allowing for price discrimination in our model, the incumbent could quote di¤er-
ent prices for di¤erent consumers, depending on their specic willingness to pay.
Accordingly, under the separate ownership scenario he could nd it protable to
serve some low-type consumers willing to buy only the base good which would
be otherwise excluded from the market. This price strategy could increase the
protability of the separate ownership scenario compared with the acquisition
choice and possibly, depending on the value of parameters, change the market
structure observed at equilibrium.
The second remark concerns our choice of the vertical di¤erentiation model
compared with a horizontally di¤erentiated model. Our interest has been in
studying the economic incentives for an incumbent producing both a base good
and a complementary variant to compete or integrate with a rival in the comple-
mentary market under the assumption of di¤erent competencies in producing
the same (complementary) good. Thus, vertical di¤erentiation in the comple-
mentary market allows us to perfectly suit this scenario. Nevertheless, casual
observation points out the presence of more than one complementary (imper-
fectly substitutable) good. Thus an interesting extension would be to study
the potential introduction of many complementary goods. Horizontal di¤eren-
tiation with consumers love for variety would then allow us to describe such
a framework where reasonably the value of the base good would increase not
only with the quality of a complementary component but also with the available
number of these components. Also, under an alternative approach to horizon-
tal di¤erentiation, one could consider that a complementary variant could be
preferred over the other, depending on consumerssex, educational level and so
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on. Take the example of video-game market: there exist video-games mainly
suited for male consumers, while others better meet the requirements coming
from a young female audience. The wider the range of goods provided by a
rm, the larger the market share this rm can a priori satisfy. Such a type of
setting would allow us to study the incentives for the monopolist to integrate,
depending on the rivals production line and consumersfeatures.
While these new elements go beyond the aim of this paper, they open the
door to further research.
9 Appendix
9.1 Separate ownership equilibrium candidates
In the separate ownership scenario, each consumer can either buy only the base
good at price pu and get utility u pu; or buy the base good equipped with the
low quality (resp. high quality) complementary variant at some price PI (resp.
pu + rE ; where rE is the price of vE sold by the low-quality producer) in which
case the utility is uI PI (resp. uE pu rE); or refrain from buying. Di¤erent
market congurations can arise at the price equilibrium. In order to nd the
Nash equilibrium in the price subgame, we proceed in two steps. First, we
compute equilibrium candidates for each possible market conguration; second,
we identify the parameters constellation for which candidates e¤ectively yield
the corresponding market outcome.
Let  be the lowest consumer willing to buy something, then  = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
.
In the following, we rst prove that at equilibrium, for any value of the parame-
ters, no consumer buys the base good alone (H1), and we nd the equilibrium
market congurations for b  b (H2). This is the proof of Lemma 1. We then
nd the equilibrium market congurations for b > b (H3): this is the proof of
Lemma 2.
9.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
H1 First, we assume that  = puu = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
, namely there are at
least some consumers buying only the base good. Then, one can observe
either
PI
uI
<
pu + rE
uE
or
pu + rE
uE
<
PI
uI
:
a We start assuming that puu <
PI
uI
< pu+rEuE namely
e = PI puuI u >
pu
u ;
 = pu+rE PIuE uI >
PI pu
uI u . So, prots accruing to the monopolist
are:
I = (e   )pu + (   e)PI + (b  )pu
while the high-quality producers prots write as:
E = (b  )rE :
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Price competition leads to the following equilibrium prices:
PI =
b (2uI (uE   uI) + u (2uE + uI   3u))
8uE   6u  2uI
rE =
2b (uE   u) (uE   uI)
4uE   3u  uI
pu =
1
2
bu:
At this candidate equilibrium,    e = 12 (uI 3u+2uE)b(4uE uI 3u) > 0 which is
in contrast with the initial assumption. So, we conclude that this
candidate is not the actual equilibrium outcome.
b Then, let us assume that puu <
pu+rE
uE
< PIuI . In this case, the con-
sumer indi¤erent between buying the base good and buying the high
quality system is dened as ^ = rEuE u . So prot functions for the
incumbent and the high-quality producer write, respectively, as
I = (b  )pu;
E = (b  ^)rE :
From the FOCs, we can show that the candidate equilibrium prices
of the high quality component and the base good, are respectively,
r0E =
1
2b (uE   u) and p0u = 12bu; and candidate equilibrium prots
of the incumbent and the high-quality producer are: I = 14b
2u and
E =
1
4b
2 (uE   u). Notice however that, at these prices ^ =  = 12b.
Accordingly, it derives that those consumers buying the base good
are willing to buy the high quality component as well. That is to say
that at these candidate equilibrium prices the market conguration
with some consumers buying only the base good never arises. So, we
can conclude that this candidate is not an equilibrium outcome.
H2 Then, we move to the following assumption:  = PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
.
Also, let  = pu+rE PIuE uI , where a priori
 S b.31
a Let us assume rst that  < b. It follows that:
I = (   )PI + (b  )pu
E = (b  )rE :
31 In this case, it does not matter whether pu
u
> pu+rE
uE
or pu
u
< pu+rE
uE
as in both cases the
utility from buying the base good alone is always dominated by the utility of buying either
the low or the high quality system. That is no consumer is willing to buy the base good alone.
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Price competition leads to the following candidate equilibrium:
pu =
1
6
uI +
1
3
uE ; PI =
1
2
buI ; rE =
1
3
b (uE   uI) ;
soI =
1
36
b2 (5uI + 4uE) ;
so
E =
1
9
(uE   uI) b2;
CSso =
4u2E(2b 1)2+uIuE(b 2)2+u2I(2b 8b2+1)
72(uE uI) :
At this candidate equilibrium we have (i) PIuI <
pu
u () b < bb =
1+2uG
3u and (ii)
PI
uI
< pu+rEuE () b < b = 2uG+1(2+uG) . As b < bb, then
for b < b, the assumption that PIuI = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
is satised.
Furthermore, one gets that b >  () b > b = 2uG+14uG 1 . So, one
can conclude that for any b 2 b; b, the above candidate equilibrium
is an equilibrium, with positive market shares for both the high and
the low quality systems.
b Let us assume now that   b. We know from the above that this
assumption is met whenever b  b = 2uG+1(4uG 1) . In this case, no con-
sumer is willing to buy the high quality system, and prot functions
for the incumbent and the high-quality producer write as
so;II (PI ; pu; rE) = (b  )PI ;
so;IE (PI ; pu; rE) = 0:
From price competition, one immediately gets the equilibrium prot
for the incumbent
so;II =
1
4
uIb
2:
So, one can conclude that for any b  b, the high-quality producer
does not face any demand as b  , and so;II = mI .
9.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
H3 Let us nally assume that  = pu+rEuE = min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
.32 In this
market conguration all consumers buy the base good bundled with the
high quality complementary variant. From H2, where we prove that the
equilibrium is so for b 2 b; b and it is so; I for b  b, it follows that this
is possible i¤ b > b. Then, prot functions write as
I = (b  )pu;
E = (b  )rE :
It is easy to show that the candidate equilibrium prices are pso;Eu =
1
3buE
and rso;EE =
1
3buE , so that at equilibrium
 < b and so;Ei =
1
9b
2uE ,
32As in case H2, it does not matter whether pu
u
> PI
uI
or pu
u
< PI
uI
.
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with i = I; E. At this candidate equilibrium, it emerges that pu+rEuE <
pu
u () (uE   2u) > 0. So, one can conclude that whenever b > b
this candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium i¤ uE > 2u. It remains to
study the equilibrium conguration in the case when uE < 2u. As in
this range of parameters, pu+rEuE >
pu
u , then the analysis in H1b applies.
At the candidate equilibrium H1b, the assumption in H3 that all active
consumers buy the high quality complementary system, namely pu+rEuE =
min
n
pu
u ;
PI
uI
; pu+rEuE
o
is satised in the limit as pu+rEuE =
pu
u . Thus, we
conclude that the candidate equilibrium H1b is an equilibrium in the range
of parameters b > b and uE < 2u.
9.2 Social welfare
Social welfare in each equilibrium scenario is:
SW so =
 
4uIuE   4buIuE + u2I + 4u2E + 2bu2I   16bu2E   13b2uIuE   10b2u2I + 32b2u2E

72 (uE   uI)
SW so;I = SWm =
3
8
uIb
2
SW so;E =
5
18
uEb
2
SW int =
3
8
uEb
2
As to verify whether integration dominates the alternative from a social
welfare viewpoint, we proceed as in Section 5. Thus, we rst recall that for
b < b, or b > b and uG < 94 , the outside option is monopoly; while it is separate
ownership for b 2 b; b or b > b and uG > 94 . It is immediate to see that
SW under integration (SW int = 38uEb
2) is higher than that under monopoly
(SWm = 38uIb
2) in the range of b parameters such that monopoly is the outside
option.
Rather, in the case when the outside option is separate ownership, comparing
the equilibrium SW under separate ownership versus integration, we nd that,
for b 2 b; b:
SW so   SW int = (uI+2uE)
2 2b(4uE uI)(uI+2uE)+b2(14uIuE 10u2I+5u2E)
72(uE uI)
The above di¤erence is negative, SW so   SW int < 0 as the two b-roots are
outside the admissible interval (b 2 b; b). In the case when b > b and uG > 94 ,
then
SW so;E   SW int =   7
72
b2uE < 0 .
Integration is thus always socially optimal.
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9.3 Reversed quality
Assume that the incumbent monopolist produces the high quality complemen-
tary variant whereas the rival produces the low quality variant, i.e. vI > vE ,
so that uI > uE > u. Also, producing these variants is costly, in particular the
unit cost is convex in quality.
9.3.1 Entry is blockaded
Whenever the incumbent sells only the high quality system uI , entry is block-
aded. In this case, the prot function for rm I writes as:
I =

PI   u
2
I
2

b  PI
uI

Then, price P H , demand D

H and prot 

H at equilibrium are
P I =
uI (2b+ uI)
4
DI =
(2b  uI)
4
> 0 () b > uI
2
I =
1
16
(uI   2b)2 uI
Note that DI > 0 () b > uI2  bM : this proves that this strategy may not be
protable (namely, if b < bM it is not protable to produce only the high quality
system). This opens the door to the possibility to observe at equilibrium either
separate ownership or integration at some positive acquisition price.
9.3.2 Separate ownership
In this scenario, the high quality system is entirely produced by the incumbent,
the low quality system is produced by both rms, the incumbent providing the
base good, while the rival the low quality variant. In order to capture this
asymmetry, we assume that rm I incurs a cost equal to u
2
I
2 when providing the
high quality system, while the cost for rm E when producing the low quality
variant is cu
2
E
2 ; with 0 < c  1:33
Let us write the incumbents and the rivals maximization problems in the
separate ownership scenario:
max
pu;PH

(e   )(pu   u2
2
) + (   e)(pu   u2
2
) + (b  )(PI   u
2
I
2
)

max
rL

(   e)(rE   cu2E
2
)

33One could question this assumption on cost asymmetry. However, the results we provide
in this section do not qualitatively change when removing this assumption, thereby setting
c = 1:
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where  = puu ,
e = rE+pu puuL u and  = PI (rE+pu)uI uE . PI and rE are the prices of
the high quality system and the low quality complementary variant, respectively.
From the F.O.C.s, we derive the following equilibrium prices:
PI =
4uu2I 4u3I u3+u2uE+b( 2)(3uuE 4uIuE 3u2+4u2I) 2cu2E(uI u)
4(3u 4uI+uE)
rE =
(uI u)(uuE uuI+uIuE u2+2cu2E)+b2(uE u)(uI uE)
8uI 6u 2uE
pu =
1
4
u (2b+ u) :
Notice that, the demand for the base good alone Du at the equilibrium prices
writes as
Du =
(uE u)u(u+uE 2uI)+2(uI u)(uI(uE u)+2cu2E)+b( 2)(uE u)(2uI+uE 3u)
4(4uI 3u uE)(uE u) :
Let us denote by b
b =
(4u2uI u3 2uu2I 4uuIuE+uu2E 4cuu2E+2u2IuE+4cuIu2E)
2(2uI 3u+uE)(uE u)
the value of b such that Du(b) = 0 and dDudb < 0. Accordingly, for any b 1 b,
the base good alone is not bought or Du = 0, while the reverse holds for b < b.
The demand for the high quality system DH at equilibrium prices writes as
DI =
(4buE 4buI+uuI uuE uIuE u2+2u2I cu2E)
2(3u 4uI+uE) :
Denoting by b the value of b such that DH(b) = 0,
b =
(uuE uuI+uIuE+u2 2u2I+cu2E)
4(uE uI)
with dDIdb > 0, we can conclude that for any b 1 b, the high quality system is
bought or DI > 0, while the reverse holds, namely DI = 0 for b < b. Finally,
the demand for the low quality system is
DE =
(2buuI 2buuE 2buIuE u3+2bu2E cu3E+uu2I+u2uE cuu2E u2IuE+2cuIu2E)(uI u)
2(4uI 3u uE)(uE uI)(uE u)
with DE > 0 () c < (uE u)((uI u)(u+uI)+b2(uI uE))u2L(2uI u uE) 
bbc.
When comparing these b thresholds, we nd:
b  b = (u
2uI cu3E u3+uu2E cuu2E uIu2E+2cuIu2E)(4uI 3u uE)
4(2uI 3u+uE)(uI uE)(uE u)
> 0 () c > bc  (u uE)(uI u)(u+uE)
(u 2uI+uE)u2E
2 (0; 1) < bbc.
Therefore, in the range where b < uH2  bM , the incumbent allows entry
and, under separate ownership Du  0 () b  b and DH  0 () b  b.
24
As for the other b thresholds:
b  bM =
 
u2   u2E + 4cu2E

(uI   u)
2 (2uI   3u+ uE) (uE   u) > 0, always if c >
1
4
;
b  bM =
 
uuE   uuI   uIuE + u2 + cu2E

4 (uE   uI) > 0
Therefore, if c 2   14 ; 1, in the range of b < bM , we observe that Du > 0, DH = 0
and DL > 0.34
On the contrary, in the range of b; where b > bM , blocking entry gives the
incumbent positive prots. However, one cannot exclude that entry would be
more protable than blocking entry even in this range of b parameters. In order
to conclude that blocking entry is the optimal strategy, one needs to verify that
monopoly prots I =
1
16 (uI   2b)2 uI are higher than the prots it could earn
when allowing entry under separate ownership. The incumbent prot under
separate ownership depends on b as well as on c. We next provide an example
where the incumbent prefers to blockade entry. Assume c < bc < bbc, then
b < b
For b 2

maxfbM ;bg;b

, we observe Du = 0, DE > 0 and DI = 0. Then the
incumbents prot writes as:35
(2buuI 2buuE 2buIuE u3+2bu2E cu3E+uu2I+u2uE cuu2E u2IuE+2cuIu2E)(uI u)
2(3u 4uI+uE)(uI uE)(uE u)

1
4
u (2b  u)

:
This prot is decreasing in c. Comparing this prot with I =
1
16 (uI   2b)2 uI ,
we nd that blocking entry is protable i¤ c > ec, where
ec    (uE   u) A 4bB+4(uE uI)b2C2(2b u)(2uI u uE)(uI u)u2Eu
with A = 2u5+4u5I   3uu4I   2u4uI   5u4IuE +3uu3IuE +2u2u3I   2u3u2I +u3Iu2E ,
B =
 
u4 + 4u4I   2uu3I   u3uE   5u3IuE + 3uu2IuE + u2uIuE   2u2u2I + u2Iu2E

and C =
 
5uuI + uIuE   2u2   4u2I

. Therefore, we conclude that for c > ec;
entry is blockaded. Note that the sign of ec bc is the sign of the following polyno-
mial:

u3I (3u  4uI + uE)  2u2 (uI   u)2

+b24
 
(u  uI) (4uI   u) + uIuE   u2

+
b ( 4)  2u (uI   u) (u+ uI) + uI  uIuE + 3u2   4u2I. So, there are parameter
values such that ec < bc: In the range of c parameters where bc > c > ec, blocking
entry is protable.36
34b  bM () c < (uI u)(u+uE)
u2
E
, where this threshold is larger than 1.
35Note that pu   u22 > 0, always as we are in b > bM > u2 .
36One can nd numerical examples to prove that this condition holds for some parameter
values.
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9.3.3 Integration scenario
We here assume that c = 1 as the integrated rm produces the entire low quality
system. The maximization problem writes as:
max
pu;PI ;PE

(e   )(pu   u2
2
) + (   e)(PI   u2E
2
) + (b  )(PI   u
2
I
2
)

with  = puu ,
e = PE puuE u and  = PI PEuI uE . Price competition implies:
PI =
1
4
uI (2b+ uI)
PE =
1
4
uE (2b+ uE)
pu =
1
4
u (2b+ u) :
At these prices, demand for the high quality system at equilibrium is:
DII =
(2b  uI   uE)
4
:
Notice that, while demand for the base good (DIu =
1
4uE) and that for the low
quality system (DIE =
1
4 (uI   u)) turn out to be always positive, DII > 0 i¤
b > (uI uE)2 .
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